Using lseek on 64-bit offset parameter caused failure
to write persistent data in crypto footer.
Changed calls to use lseek64 instead.
Change-Id: I4e4c397a6d36201b8b08be3017e17c9fac3b34e4
The structure crypt_persist_data was allocated,
but never freed.
Added free of allocated memory in normal and
error case.
Change-Id: I9aaa067e6f6501e8ce007f8659004b5dbcf2b246
Add maybeenabledefaultencryption function, that encrypts based
on the encryption flag and appropriate environment variable
Bug: 18764230
Change-Id: Id9a1967d09a7ae63a51240c0a5f3c41505af0e9a
The libcrypto and libssl modules (and their respective static and host
versions) use LOCAL_EXPORT_C_INCLUDE_DIRS thus just including the module
is sufficient.
Additionally, cryptfs.h was including an OpenSSL header just to get the
length of a SHA-256 hash. Rather than force all users of this header to
also depend on libcrypto, it's easier just to define that value in the
header file.
Change-Id: I3e3e0db906a212e1093944b298e4a8ff2e2fb07d
Add maybeenabledefaultencryption function, that encrypts based
on the encryption flag and appropriate environment variable
Bug: 18764230
Change-Id: Id9a1967d09a7ae63a51240c0a5f3c41505af0e9a
Since the dm_ioctl struct was being allocated on the stack as a large
character array, it was getting character alignment rather than the
proper alignment for the struct. GCC had been getting away with this
so far, but it's undefined behavior that clang managed to expose.
Bug: 18736778
Change-Id: Ied275dfad7fcc41d712b2d02c8a185f499221f57
-Wno-missing-field-initializers is used as well, but that is an
overzealous warning from initializing structs with {0} and not a
real warning.
bug 18736778 and 16868177
Change-Id: Iffde89cd7200d9a11193e1614f1819f9fcace30a
encrypt-and-wipe was broken when checks were added that encryption succeeded
which assumed a 'normal' full encrypt traversing the device.
encrypt-and-wipe doesn't traverse, it just lays down a file system over
the encrypted device, so in this mode do not check the amount encrypted -
it will always be 0.
Bug: 18511900
Change-Id: Icb1d7e0cdb67abd2eac0ab3cbfc1a88912768f9d
Devices already encrypted with aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 will continue to be
decrypted in software, until a factory data reset. New devices that
implement CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION will switch to aes-xts.
b/17475056 Enable hardware crypto for userdata encryption
Change-Id: I62d1583bdaf7ff06b87e386e758fa3b18c719bca
Signed-off-by: Iliyan Malchev <malchev@google.com>
Currently Android provides disk encryption support using dm-crypt
which is based on bios. dm-crypt uses 512 bytes packet size for
crypto operations. While 512 bytes size packet is ok for SW based
disk encryption, it is inefficient for HW based crypto engines.
dm-req-crypt is similar to dm-crypt except it uses block requests
rathe bios for crypto operations. block requests when unpacked
carries data upto 512KB. Hence, HW based crypto engine can be used
more efficiently.
Also move create disk encryption key before framework start as
HW based disk encryption creates key in secure side. Key creation
can take sometime to create the key securely. If framework is
started before creating the key, it is possible that framework
requests service from secure side. Secure side can serve mostly one
request at a time. Secure side may reject framework request if key
creation request is still going on. This may cause problem in the
system
b/17475056 Enable hardware crypto for userdata encryption
Change-Id: I5480ab72a37c02532218a18faaba598a824589fd
Signed-off-by: Iliyan Malchev <malchev@google.com>
vold should only use hardware keymaster implementations to protect the
disk encryption key, because there's little value in using the software
implementation. More importantly, if we allow vold to use softkeymaster
in the absence of a HW keymaster and (somehow) a HW keymaster is added
to a device, the HW version will be loaded, and will be unable to use
the softkeymaster key found in the crypto footer, forcing a factory
reset.
This CL will not break devices without HW keymaster, because
softkeymaster currently reports its keys as non-standalone (which isn't
correct). After this CL is in, I will fix softkeymaster.
Bug: 17362157
Change-Id: I98b169e7a59ff7d44b72069b87743463ec823ea2
Store long field values in multiple underlying fixed-length entries
and concatenate them together when reading back.
Bug: 17556485
Change-Id: I2f8033d18c208993fa1b010712be0dad5d8b646b
There are cases where the /dev/block/dm-0 fails to open.
This leads to the device not completing the boot up sequence.
Currently, the only way out is to reboot.
Bug: 17898962
Change-Id: If4583ebb1ef1ebdbaf680d69b876459aaec2f4ce
(cherry picked from commit 7fc1de8a44)
There are cases where the /dev/block/dm-0 fails to open.
This leads to the device not completing the boot up sequence.
Currently, the only way out is to reboot.
Bug: 17898962
Change-Id: If4583ebb1ef1ebdbaf680d69b876459aaec2f4ce
Some times the /dev/block/dm-0 fails to open after it has been setup.
Log why.
Bug: 17576594
Bug: 17942270
Change-Id: If0bbfe22d84137f2029bacb10873832038f0d36c
Some times the /dev/block/dm-0 fails to open after it has been setup.
Log why.
Bug: 17576594
Bug: 17942270
Change-Id: If0bbfe22d84137f2029bacb10873832038f0d36c
scrypt pads the password with zeros. Our patterns use 0 to represent
the top left dot. So patterns that end there are equivalent to ones
that end one short.
After much thought, the best solution is to change the way we
represent patterns in keyguard. This, however, is a big change.
The short term solution is to change the pattern representation in vold
so that we are storing the correct thing. Later we will change keyguard
to handle patterns correctly and remove quite a few hacks from vold
(use of hex, this code). b/17840293 created to track this.
Bug: 17751714
Change-Id: I30cdffb0f0db406d2e2b6c54d4153d120d975318
cryptfs will fail to remount /data at boot if any processes (e.g.
dex2oat) have files open on the tmpfs /data partition. Since these
files are about to be destroyed anyway, just kill the offending
processes: first with SIGHUP and finally with SIGKILL.
Also remove a stray i++ that effectively cut the number of retries in
half.
Bug: 17576594
Change-Id: I76fb90ce2e52846ffb9de706e52b7bde98b4186a
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Otherwise we get strange results when the time changes. Worst
effect is that the encryption takes a lot longer since we are
calling the logging code far more frequently.
Bug: 17625981
Change-Id: Ice29f28b3720e9e4a1ea28e45eeab574d1959ec1
Change-Id: I88ae719cdae490433390d624f75612a9f4f96677
Cryptfs : Enabling support for allow_discards in dmcrypt.
Cryptfs : Password matches
Cryptfs : test_mount_encrypted_fs(): Master key saved
TrustyKeymaster: Creating device
TrustyKeymaster: Device address: 0x7f8f416100
Cryptfs : keymaster version is 3
Cryptfs : Just asked init to shut down class main
ServiceManager: service 'drm.drmManager' died
ServiceManager: service 'media.audio_flinger' died
ServiceManager: service 'media.player' died
ServiceManager: service 'media.camera' died
ServiceManager: service 'android.security.keystore' died
Cryptfs : unmounting /data failed
Bug: 17576594
This change simply switches from the deprecated
EVP_{En|De}crypt{Init|Final} to the newer, _ex versions of the same.
There is no difference in behaviour, save for calling
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init, as the deprecated versions are just wrappers around
the _ex functions. See
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blob;f=crypto/evp/evp_enc.c;h=f705967a40ab92cdf3c2ba8dd6bc19680d6157d6;hb=HEAD#l274
This change is required for the transition to BoringSSL, which removes
the deprecated functions.
Bug: 17409664
Change-Id: I35c6cc2d86d0c876a9edaff1e5571170fe393d87
Signed-off-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Correct implementations of keymaster should reject using an n-bit
RSA key to sign less than n bits of data, because we specify that
keymaster should not perform padding.
Change-Id: Ibdff1bbfbee84fd5bdbfb3149a124dbbaa7827fc
Note that this also changes the boot sequence, and moves the test for corrupted
data to cryptfs_restart_internal.
Bug: 17213613
Change-Id: I0f86e8fe3d482e2d1373bd0f4d0d861e63ad8904
In field reports, sometimes the remaining time gets stuck for many
minutes. This has to be caused by a spurious low reading early on which
cannot be overridded because of old logic.
Solution: allow time to increase but only by large amounts (avoid time
jittering up and down).
Bug: 16973374
Change-Id: I49d23ae8c54ded416cbedf383a3c03b33dc02e1c
Store salted scrypt of intermediate key in crypto header
When mount fails, check if matches, and if it does return error
code prompting a wipe
Bug: 11477689
Change-Id: I3dcf9e0c64f2a01c8ba8eaf58df82cbe717d421b
Set flag on starting encryption to say it failed, and only clear
when we get into a recoverable state (partially or fully encrypted.)
Go to recovery on seeing this flag on boot
Bug: 16552363
Change-Id: I7e452b653edf3a087ecfaba8f81f41765a1c8daf
When a crypto is enabled with a wipe flag (obsolete?),
it will correctly handle the fstab's choice for the fs type.
Remove the dead code for FAT_FS which was un-invocable.
Change-Id: I8d141a0d4d14df9fe84d3b131484e9696fcd8870
Signed-off-by: JP Abgrall <jpa@google.com>
The code was using encrypted_upto == 0 as an indicator that encryption
has succeeded. This meant that if no encryption happened, we would reboot
continually.
We now set encrypted_upto to fs_size when encryption is complete.
Also don't start to encrypt unless we are at 10% power. Stop when we
get to 5% power. This should lead to partial encryptions only very
rarely.
Bug: 15513202
Change-Id: I6214d78579d1fbbe2f63ee8862473d86a89d29b3
This reverts commit 5cc86c5741.
Without two more commits, this will break encryption. I'll re-commit when the other two pass code review.
Change-Id: I71720d065c16cf0f7f534e74ffe883f1e113c477
Stop encryption when battery is low, mark position, and continue on reboot.
Note - support for multiple encrypted volumes removed as no devices seem
to exist with an fstab that uses this feature. If you want support for such
a device, contact me and we will re-add it with appropriate testing.
Bug: 13284213
Change-Id: I1f7178e4f7dd8ea816cbc03ab5c4f6543e98acaa
If we are not to double prompt, we need to pass the password from
CryptKeeper to KeyStore. Since the entire framework is taken down
and restarted, we must store the password in a secure system daemon.
There seems no better way than holding it in vold.
Change-Id: Ia60f2f051fc3f87c4b6468465f17b655f43f97de
Add a call to vold that says if we decrypted the data partition. Reset the
flag so that it only returns true the first time.
Bug: 12990752
Change-Id: Ib00be87137c00fb8ad29205c85a3ea187764b702
Modify enablecrypto command to make the password optional. When it is
not there, default encrypt the device.
Remove a warning by making at least some parts of this file const-correct.
Bug: 11985952
Change-Id: Ie27da4c4072386d9d6519d97ff46c6dc4ed188dc
Elliott Hughes
Björn Landström
Henrik Baard
Paul Lawrence
Kenny Root
Adam Langley
Brian Carlstrom
Dan Albert
Tim Murray
Iliyan Malchev
Ajay Dudani
Shawn Willden
Rubin Xu
JP Abgrall
Greg Hackmann
Jeff Sharkey
jessica_yu
Alex Klyubin
Daniel Rosenberg
Jim Miller